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2013-06-11 - Colloque/Présentation - communication orale - Anglais - 1 page(s)

Laureti Carolina , "The Time-Inconsistency Factor: How Banks Adapt to their Mix of Savers" in Third European Research Conference on Microfinance, Kristiansand, Norvège, 2013

  • Codes CREF : Marchés financiers (DI4391)
  • Unités de recherche UMONS : Economie et gestion de l'entreprise (W742)
  • Instituts UMONS : Institut de Recherche en Développement Humain et des Organisations (HumanOrg)
  • Centres UMONS : Microfinance (CERMI)

Abstract(s) :

(Anglais) Our equilibrium model determines the liquidity premium offered by a monopolistic bank to a pool of depositors made up of time-consistent and time-inconsistent agents. Time-consistent depositors demand compensation for illiquidity, whereas time-inconsistent ones are willing to forgo interest on illiquid savings accounts to discipline their future selves. The model delivers both pooling and separating equilibria. In the pooling equilibrium, which is more likely when the market is dominated by time-consistent agents, time-inconsistent depositors obtain a higher-than-demanded liquidity premium. This key result is consistent with stylized facts from Bangladesh. We discuss the consequences of our findings from a regulatory perspective.