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2016-07-30 - Colloque/Présentation - communication orale - Anglais - 18 page(s)

De Pril Julie , Godfroid Cécile , "How to reconcile financial incentives and pro-social motivation of loan officers in microfinance?" in World Finance Conference, New York, Etats-Unis, 2016

  • Codes CREF : Economie des PVD (DI4375), Management (DI4360)
  • Unités de recherche UMONS : Economie et gestion de l'entreprise (W742), Mathématiques effectives (S820)
  • Instituts UMONS : Institut de Recherche sur les Systèmes Complexes (Complexys), Institut de Recherche en Développement Humain et des Organisations (HumanOrg)
  • Centres UMONS : Microfinance (CERMI), Modélisation mathématique et informatique (CREMMI)

Abstract(s) :

(Anglais) More and more double bottom line microfinance institutions, which pursue both social and financial objectives, have adopted an incentive scheme to motivate their credit officers to improve their financial performance. However, the crowding-out hypothesis, developed by some psychologists, suggests that monetary rewards may not always be optimal as they may reduce prosocial motivation. Therefore, according to this theory, loan officers may be less willing to take care about clients when receiving financial incentives, what might then jeopardize the social mission of the microfinance institution. In this paper, we attempt to suggest, with a mathematical model, an optimal incentive scheme microfinance institutions could rely on in order to increase their financial profit while preserving loan officers' prosocial motivation.