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2010-02-15 - Travail sans promoteur/Travail de séminaire / Working Papers - Anglais - 29 page(s) (A publier)

Labie Marc , Méon Pierre-Guillaume, Mersland Roy, Szafarz Ariane, "Discrimination by Microcredit Officers: Theory and Evidence on Disability in Uganda", 2010-02-15

  • Codes CREF : Economie de l'entreprise (DI4322), Economie des PVD (DI4375)
  • Unités de recherche UMONS : Economie et gestion de l'entreprise (W742)
  • Instituts UMONS : Institut de Recherche en Développement Humain et des Organisations (HumanOrg)
  • Centres UMONS : Microfinance (CERMI)
Texte intégral :

Abstract(s) :

(Anglais) This paper studies the relationship between a microfinance institution (MFI) and its credit officers when the latter are biased against a subgroup of the clientele. Using survey data from Uganda, we provide evidence that credit officers are more biased against disabled borrowers than other employees. In line with the evidence, we then build an agency model of a non-profit MFI and a discriminatory credit officer. Since incentive schemes are costly, and the MFI’s budget is limited, even a non discriminating welfare-maximizing MFI may prefer paying smaller incentivizing compensation, and letting its credit officer discriminate to some extent.

Notes :
  • (Anglais) CEB Working Paper N° 10/007 - February, 2010